All the king's horses, and all the king's men, Couldn't put Humpty together again.
Introduction I: Inverting Functions
From time immemorial, humanity has gotten frequent, often cruel, reminders that many things are easier to do than to reverse. When the foundations of mathematics started to be seriously analyzed, this experience immediately found a formal expression.
An Odd Axiom
Over a century ago, George Cantor reduced all the great variety of mathematical concepts to just one-the concept of sets-and derived all mathematical theorems from just one axiom scheme-Cantor's Postulate. For each set-theoretical formula A(x), it postulates the existence of a set containing those and only those x satisfying A. This axiom looked a triviality, almost a definition, but was soon found to yield more than Cantor wanted, including contradictions. To salvage its great promise, Zermelo, Fraenkel, and others pragmatically replaced 2 Introduction II: Extravagant Models
The Downfall of RSA
This development was all the more remarkable as the very existence of one-way (i.e., easy to compute, infeasible to invert) functions remains unproven and subject to repeated assaults. The first came from Shamir himself, one of the inventors of the RSA system. He proved [16] that factoring (on infeasibility of which RSA depends) can be done in polynomial number of arithmetic operations. This result uses a so-called "unit-cost model," which charges one unit for each arithmetic operation, however long the operands. Squaring a number doubles its length, repeated squaring brings it quickly to cosmological sizes. Embedding a huge array of ordinary numbers into such a long one allows one arithmetic step to do much work, e.g., to check exponentially many factor candidates. The closed-minded cryptographers, however, were not convinced and this result brought a dismissal of the unit-cost model, not RSA.
Another, not dissimilar, attack is raging this very moment. It started with the brilliant result of Peter Shor. He factors integers in polynomial time using an imaginary analog device, Quantum Computer (QC), inspired by the laws of quantum physics taken to their formal extreme.
Quantum Computers
QC has n interacting elements, called q-bits. A pure state of each is a unit vector on the complex plane C 2 . Its two components are quantum amplitudes of its two Boolean values. A state of the entire machine is a vector in the tensor product of n planes. Its 2 n coordinate vectors are tensor-products of q-bit basis states, one for each n-bit combination. The machine is cooled, isolated from the environment nearly perfectly, and initialized in one of its basis states representing the input and empty memory bits. The computation is arranged as a sequence of perfectly reversible interactions of the q-bits, putting their combination in the superposition of a rapidly increasing number of basis states, each having an exponentially small amplitude. The environment may intervene with errors; the computation is done in an error-correcting way, immune to such errors as long as they are few and of special restricted forms. Otherwise, the equations of Quantum Mechanics are obeyed with unlimited precision. This is crucial since the amplitudes are exponentially small and deviations in remote (hundredth or even much further) decimal places would overwhelm the content completely. In [17] , such computers are shown capable of factoring in polynomial time. The exponentially many coordinates of their states can, using a rough analogy, explore one potential solution each and concentrate the amplitudes in the one that works.
Small Difficulties
There are many problems with such QCs. For instance, thermal isolation cannot be perfect. Tiny backgrounds of neutrinos, gravitational waves, and other exotics, cannot be shielded. Their effects on quantum amplitudes need not satisfy the restrictions on which error-correcting tools depend. Moreover, nondissipating computing gates, even classical, remain a speculation. Decades past, their existence was cheerfully proclaimed and even proved for worlds where the laws of physical interaction can be custom-designed. In our world, where the electromagnetic interaction between electrons, nuclei, and photons is about the only one readily available, circuits producing less entropy than computing remain hypothetical. So, low temperatures have limits and even a tiny amount of heat can cause severe decoherence problems. Furthermore, the uncontrollable degrees of freedom need not behave simply as heat. Interaction with the intricately correlated q-bits may put them in devilish states capable of conspiracies which defy imagination.
Remote Decimals
All such problems, however, are peanuts. The major problem is the requirement that basic quantum equations hold to multi-hundredth if not millionth decimal positions where the significant digits of the relevant quantum amplitudes reside. We have never seen a physical law valid to over a dozen decimals. Typically, every few new decimal places require major rethinking of most basic concepts. Are quantum amplitudes still complex numbers to such accuracies or do they become quaternions, colored graphs, or sick-humored gremlins? I suspect physicists would doubt even the laws of arithmetic pushed that far. In fact, we know that the most basic laws cannot all be correct to hundreds of decimals: this is where they stop being consistent with each other! And what is the physical meaning of 500 digit long numbers? What could one possibly mean by saying "This box has a remarkable property: its many q-bits contain the Ten Commandments with the amplitude whose first 500 decimal places end with 666"? What physical interpretation could this statement have even for just this one amplitude? Close to the tensor product basis, one might have opportunities to restate the assertions using several short measurable numbers instead of one long. Such opportunities may also exist for large systems, such as lasers or condensates, where individual states matter little. But QC factoring uses amplitudes of an exponential number of highly individualized basis states. I doubt anything short of the most generic and direct use of these huge precisions would be easy to substitute. One can make the amplitudes more "physical" by choosing a less physical basis. Let us look into this.
Too Small Universe
QC proponents often say they win either way, by making a working QC or by finding a correction to Quantum Mechanics; e.g., in [18] Peter Shor said: "If there are nonlinearities in quantum mechanics which are detectable by watching quantum computers fail, physicists will be VERY interested (I would expect a Nobel prize for conclusive evidence of this)."
Consider, however, this scenario. With few q-bits, QC is eventually made to work. The progress stops, though, long before QC factoring starts competing with pencils. The QC people then demand some noble prize for the correction to the Quantum Mechanics. But the committee wants more specifics than simply a nonworking machine, so something like observing the state of the QC is needed. Then they find the Universe too small for observing individual states of the needed dimensions and accuracy. (Raising sufficient funds to compete with pencil factoring may justify a Nobel Prize in Economics.)
Let us make some calculations. In cryptography, the length n of the integers to factor may be a thousand bits (and could easily be millions.) By ∼ n, I will mean a reasonable power of n. 
Metric versus Topology
A gap in quantum formalism may be contributing to the confusion. Approximation has two subtly different aspects: metric and topology. Metric tells how close our ideal point is to a specific wrong one. Topology tells how close it is to the combination of all unacceptable (nonneighboring) points. This may differ from the distance to the closest unacceptable point, especially for quantum systems.
In infinite dimensions, the distinction between 0 and positive separation between a point and a set varies with topologies. In finite dimensions, 0-vs.-positive distinction is too coarse: all topologies agree. Since 2 500 is finite only in a very philosophical sense, one needs a quantitative refinement, some sort of a weak-topological (not metric) depth of a neighborhood polynomially related to resources required for precision to a given depth. Then, precision to reasonable depths would be physical, e.g., allow one to generate points inside the neighborhood, distinguish its center from the outside, etc.
Metric defines ε-neighborhoods and is richer in that than topology where the specific value of ε is lost (only ε > 0 is assured). However, metric is restricted by the axiom that the intersection of any set of ε-neighborhoods is always another ε-neighborhood. Quantum proximity may require both benefits: defined depth ε and freedom to express it by formulas violating the "intersection axiom." Here is an example of such a violation, without pretense of relevance to our needs. Suppose a neighborhood of 0 is given by a set of linear inequalities f i (x) < 1; then its depth may be taken as 1/ i f i . Restricting x to the unit sphere would render this depth quadratically close to metric depth. A more relevant formula may need preferred treatment of tensor product basis.
The Cheaper Boon
QC of the sort that factors long numbers seems firmly rooted in science fiction. It is a pity that popular accounts do not distinguish it from much more believable ideas, like Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Communications, and the sort of Quantum Computing that deals primarily with locality restrictions, such as fast search of long arrays. It is worth noting that the reasons why QC must fail are by no means clear; they merit thorough investigation. The answer may bring much greater benefits to the understanding of basic physical concepts than any factoring device could ever promise. The present attitude is analogous to, say, Maxwell selling the Daemon of his famous thought experiment as a path to cheaper electricity from heat. If he did, much of insights of today's thermodynamics might be lost or delayed.
The rest of the article ignores any extravagant models and stands fully committed to the Polynomial Overhead Church-Turing Thesis: Any computation that takes t steps on an s-bit device can be simulated by a Turing Machine in s O(1) t steps within s O(1) cells.
The Treacherous Averaging
Worst-case hardness of inverting functions may bring no significant implications. Imagine that all instances come in two types: "easy" and "hard." The easy instances x take x 2 time. An exponential expected time of randomized algorithms is required both to solve, and to find any hard instance. So, the Universe would be too small to ever produce intractable instances, and the inversion problem would pose no practical difficulty. It is "generic," not worst-case, instances that both frustrate algorithm designers and empower cryptographers to do their incredible feats. The definition of "generic," however, requires great care.
Las Vegas Algorithms
First we must agree on how to measure the performance of inverters. Besides instances x = f (w), algorithms A(x, α) inverting one-way functions f can use random dice sequences α ∈ {0, 1} N . They never need a chance for (always filterable) wrong answers. So we restrict ourselves to Las Vegas algorithms which can only produce a correct output, abort, or diverge.
For a given x, the performance of A has two aspects: the volume 1 V of computation and the chance p V (over α) of success in V steps. They are not independent: p can be always boosted while roughly preserving V /p (more precisely −V / log(1−p)) by simply running A on several independent α. This idea suggests the popular requirement that Las Vegas algorithms be normalized to, say, p ≥ . The problem with this restriction is that estimating p and the needed number of trials may require exponential volume overhead in the worst case. Thus, only such measures as average volume can be kept reasonable while normalizing the chance. It is important that both are averaged only over A's own dice α; the instance x is chosen by the adversary. In this setting, the duplicity of performance aspects does become redundant: p and average volume are freely interchangeable (to shrink the latter, one simply runs A with a small chance).
Combining several runs into one lessens the modularity and counting the runs needed does involve some overhead. However, there are more substantial reasons to prefer normalization of average volume to that of the success rate p. In some settings, success is a matter of degree. For instance, different inverses of the same instance of a owf may be of different and hard-to-compare value. Normalizing the average volume, on the other hand, is robust. This volume bound may be O(1) if the model of computation is very specific. If flexibility between several reasonable models is desired, polynomial bounds, specific to each algorithm, may be preferable. There is one obstacle: the set of algorithms with a restricted expected complexity is not recursively enumerable. We can circumvent this problem by using the following enforceable form of the bound. Despite its tight O(1) expected complexity bound, L is robust since any Las Vegas algorithm can be put in this form, roughly preserving the ratio between the complexity bound and the success rate. The inverse of the latter gives the number of runs required for a constant chance of success, thus playing the role of running time. An extra benefit is that a reader adverse to bothering with the inner workings of computers can just accept their restriction to L and view all further analysis in purely probabilistic terms!
Definition 1 Las Vegas algorithms
A(x, α) ∈ LV(b) start
Multimedian Time
Averaging over the instance x is, however, much trickier. It is not robust to define generic complexity of an algorithm A(x) running in t(x) steps as its expected time E x t(x). A different device may have a quadratic time overhead. For instance, recognition of input palindromes requires quadratic time on a Turing machine with one tape, but only linear time with two tapes. It may be that a similar overhead exists for much slower algorithms, too. Then t(x) may be, say, x 2 for x ∈ 0 * , while t(0 . . . 0) may be 2 x for one device and 4 x for another. Take x uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n . Then E x t(x) for these devices would be quadratic and exponential respectively: averaging does not commute with squaring. Besides, this exponential average hardness is misleading since the hard instances would never appear in practice! More device-independent would be the median time, the minimal number of steps spent for the harder half of instances. This measure, however, is not robust in another respect: it can change dramatically if its half threshold is replaced with, say, a quarter.
Fortunately, these problems disappear as one of the many benefits of our Las Vegas conventions. One can simply take algorithms in L and measure their chance of success for inputs chosen randomly with a given distribution. The inverse of this chance, as a function of, say, input length, is a robust measure of security of a one-way function. This measure is important in cryptography, where any noticeable chance of breaking the code must be excluded. A different measure is required for positive tasks aimed at success for almost all instances. We start by considering a combined distribution over all instance lengths.
Definition 2 We consider an L-distribution of instances, i.e., a distribution of outputs of an L-algorithm's on empty input.
3 Now, we run the generator k times (spending an average time of O(k)) and apply the inverter until all generated solvable instances are solved. 4 The 2 Pronounced "Las" algorithms to hint at Las Vegas and the term's inventor Laszlo Babai. I would like to stress that no YACC (Yet Another Complexity Class) is being introduced here. L is a form of algorithms; this is much less abstract than a class of algorithms or, especially, a class of problems solvable by a class of algorithms. Besides, it is not really new, just a slight tightening of the Las Vegas restriction.
3 If the instance generator is not algorithmic, the definition can be modified to use the output length instead of complexity in the definition of L. The instances of length n should have probabilities combining to a polynomial, e.g., p(x) = 1/( x log x ) 2 . 4 If the generator can produce unsolvable instances too, the definition ignores them.
number of trials is a random variable depending on the inverter's and generator's dice. Its median value MT(k) is called the multimedian time of inverting f by A.
This measure is robust in many respects. It commutes with squaring the inverter's complexity and, thus, is robust against variation of models. It does not depend much on the 1 2 probability cut-off used for median. Indeed, increasing k by a factor of c raises MT(k) as much as does tightening the inverter's failure probability to 2 −c . MT is relevant for both upper and lower bounds. Let T(x) be high for ε fraction of x ∈ {0, 1} n . Then MT(k) is as high for k = n 3 /ε. Conversely, let MT(k) be high. Then, with overwhelming probability, T(x i ) is at least as high for some of n = k 2 random x 1 , . . . , x n (and
Nice Distributions
So far, we addressed the variance of performance of a randomized algorithm over its variable dice for a fixed input, as well as the issue of averaging it over variable input with a given distribution. Now we must address the variance of distributions. Choosing the right distributions is not always trivial, a fact often dismissed by declaring them uniform. Such declarations are confusing, though, since many different distributions deserve the name.
For instance, consider graphs G = (V, E ⊂ V 2 ), V = n, where n is chosen with probability c/n 2 (here, c is a normalizing factor). For a given n, graphs G are chosen with two distributions, both with a claim to uniformity: µ 1 chooses G with equal probability among all 2 n 2 graphs; µ 2 first chooses k = E with uniform probability 1/(n 2 + 1) and then G with equal probability among all the C k n 2 candidates. The set {G : E = n 1.5 } has then µ 2 probability 1/(n 2 + 1), while its µ 1 is exponentially small. In fact, all nice distributions can be described as uniform in a reasonable representation. Let me reproduce the argument, sketched briefly in [19] , adding an additional aspect that I will use later.
Let us use set-theoretic representation of integers: n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. A measure µ is an additive real function of sets of integers; µ(n) = µ({0}) + µ({1}) + . . . + µ({n − 1}) is its monotone distribution function. Its density µ ′ (n) = µ(n + 1) − µ(n) = µ({n}) is the probability of {n} as a singleton, rather than of a set n = {0, 1, . . . , n −1}. Let Q 2 be the set of binary fractions i/2 i ∈ [1/2, 1). We round the real-valued µ to Q 2 , keeping only as many binary digits as needed for constant factor accuracy of probabilities. The last condition is just a convenience and can be met simply by mixing the (monotone) µ with some simple distribution.
Lemma 1 Every computable µ: N → Q 2 can be uniformly transformed into a perfectly rounded µ 1 computable at most x times slower than µ(x) and so that, for nondecreasing µ (i.e., one with µ
Monotonicity is assured by comparing µ(x) with µ(y), for prefixes y of x ∈ Q 2 . Then the claim can be achieved by rounding. First, round µ(x) to the shortest binary p that is closer to it than to any other µ(y) and call these rounded values points. Find all slots, i.e., closest to p shorter binary fractions of each binary length. Then, for each slot in the order of increased lengths, find the point that fills it in the successive roundings until the slot for x is found.
All perfectly rounded µ have a curious property: both m(x) = µ(x)/µ({x}) and m(x) = − log µ({x}) are always integers, making µ(x) = .m(x) ∈ Q 2 , a fraction expressed by bits of m(x) following the dot. So m is quite uniformly distributed:
It is also computable in polynomial time, as m −1 is (by binary search). So, we can use m(x) as an alternative representation for x, in which the distribution µ is remarkably uniform.
Simple distributions are not normally general enough. They may be the ultimate source of the information in the instances x of our problems, but the original information r is transformed into x by some process A that may itself be something like a one-way function. We can assume that A is an algorithm with a reasonable time bound, but not that its output distribution is simple. Such distributions are called samplable. In [20] , samplable distributions are dealt with in a similar manner as with those in this section, though through a different trick.
Completeness

Complete Distributions and Inverters
Given a function to invert, how would one generate hard instances? There are two aspects of the problem. The first is achieving a significant probability of generation of hard instances. The second is keeping the probability of easy instances negligible. A number of reductions (with various limitations) exist between these tasks. Let us restrict our attention to the first one.
First, note that Lemma 1 enumerates all distributions computable in time t(x), preserving t within a linear factor. Thus, we can generate the largest of all these distributions by adding them up with summable coefficients, say, 1/i 2 . This distribution will be complete for TIME(t(x)) and belong to TIME(t(x) x ). A nice alternative would be to combine all complexities by translating high times into small probabilities, similarly to Section 3.1. Instead, we will switch to samplable distributions directly.
Definition 4 Distributions generated by algorithms in L without input are called samplable.
If the algorithm has inputs, they are treated as a parameter for a family of samplable distributions.
Usual versions of this definitions are broader, allowing a class of algorithms closer to LV(P) and generation of polynomially larger distributions; we limit the generators to L for greater precision.
Proposition 1 There exists a complete, i.e., largest up to constant factors, family of samplable distributions.
The lemma follows if we note that L is enumerable and, thus, the complete distribution can be obtained by choosing members of L at random and running them. The generator of this distribution spends O(1) average time per run and has the greatest in L (up to a constant factor) capacity for generating surprises. (Compared to LV(P) algorithms, its chance of a nasty surprise may be polynomially smaller.)
Since the complete distribution makes sense only to within a constant factor, it is robust in logarithmic scale only and defines an objective hardness of "hitting" a set X given x. Notation 1 By Kl(X/x), we denote the − log of probability of a set X under the complete distribution family parameterized by x.
As often happens, a strong attack tool helps inventing a strong defense. Optimal searches were noted, e.g., in [21, 22, 23 ] but here we get a nice version for free. The complete generator of hard instances can be used as an optimal algorithm for solving them. Since algorithms in L combine time into probability, their performance is measured by their chance of success. The generator of an optimal distribution family (parameterized by the instance x) has the highest, up to a constant factor, chance 1/S(f /x) = 2 − Kl(f −1 (x)/x) of generating solutions. Its minus logarithm s(f /x) measures the hardness of each individual instance x and is called its security. The generator takes an O(1) average time per run and succeeds in expected S(f /x) runs. No other method can do better.
Open problem. The constant factor in the optimal inversion algorithm may be arbitrarily large. It is unknown whether it can be limited to a fixed constant (say, 10) independent of the competing algorithm for sufficiently large instances.
Inversion Problems and OWFs
A complete distribution achieves about as high probability of hard instances as possible. Using it makes the choice of a hard-to-invert function easy: all NP-complete functions would do similarly well. However, the interesting goal is usually to find a function that is tough for some standard, say, uniform distribution of instances. Serendipitously, Lemma 1 transforms any P-time distribution into a uniform one via an appropriate encoding. Combined with this encoding, any NP-complete function joins those hardest to invert. However, the encoding destroys the function's appeal, so the problem of combining a nice function with a nice distribution remains.
Of course, while many functions seem hard, none are proven to be such. In [19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27] , a number of combinatorial and algebraic problems are proved to be complete on average with uniform distributions, i.e., as hard as any inversion problem with samplable distribution could be.
These results, however, do not quite yield owfs. The difference between owf and complete on average inversion problems can be described in many ways. The simplest one is to define owfs as hard on average problems of inverting length-preserving functions. In this case the choice between picking at random a witness (crucial for owfs), or an instance, becomes unimportant.
Indeed, each witness gives only one instance. So if length is preserved, the uniform distribution restricted to solvable instances does not exceed the one generated by uniformly distributed witnesses. On the other hand, if the witnesses are mapped into much fewer hard instances, they must have many siblings. Then, the function can be modified as follows. Guess the logarithm k of the number of siblings of the witness w and pick a random member a of a universal hash family h a (w). Output f (w), k, a, h ′ a (w), where h ′ is h truncated to k bits. (These outputs, i.e. instances, are k bits too long but can be hashed into strings of the same length as the witnesses.) The extra information in the output (if k is guessed correctly) is nearly random, and so makes inversion no easier. However, the siblings are separated into small groups and the numbers (and, thus, uniform probabilities) of hard instances and their witnesses become comparable. The converse is also true:
Proposition 2 Any owf with multimedian V (k) of its security S(x) (for uniformly random w and x = f (w)) can be transformed into a length-preserving owf with a 1/O(k) fraction of instances that have security polynomially related to V .
First, the fraction of hard instances is boosted as described at the end of Section 3.2. If the number of hard instances is much smaller than that of their witnesses, the function can still be made length-preserving without altering its hardness by separating the siblings as in the previous paragraph. See [20] for more detailed computations of the results of hashing owfs.
Complete OWF: Tiling Expansion
We now modify the Tiling Problem to create a complete combinatorial owf. No such owf has been described yet, though [9] shows the existence of an artificial complete owf. It would be nice to have several complete owfs that are less artificial, i.e., intuitive to someone who does not care to know the definition of computability. Below, such an example is given as a seed. Hopefully, a critical mass of such examples will be achieved some day providing an arsenal for reductions to more popular owf candidates to show their completeness.
NP versus owf completeness. It is a mystery why the industry of proving worst-case NPcompleteness of nice combinatorial problems is so successful. Of course, such questions refer to art rather than science and so need not have a definite answer. It seems important that several "clean" complete combinatorial NP problems are readily available without awkward complexities that plague deterministic computation models. Yet, average-case completeness is only slowly overcoming this barrier. And for complete owfs, my appeal to produce even one clean example remained unanswered for two decades.
A complete owf is easy to construct as a modification of a universal Turing Machine (UTM). UTM computation, in turn, is easy to transform into combinatorial objects (tiled squares, etc.). These objects are stripped from the many technicalities needed to define a model of computation. Indeed, these technicalities are involved in making computation deterministic, which is unnecessary since the final relation is intended to be nondeterministic anyway. The "stripped" versions have simple combinatorial structure and appeal, which makes it possible to find so many reductions to other mathematical objects.
This approach works for constructing average-complete NP problems. It fails, however, to preserve length which is needed for constructing complete owfs. (In some other definitions, length-preservation is replaced with other requirements, but these, too, are destroyed by the above construction.) Here, I use simple tools, such as the concept of expansion, to try to make a first step to overcome these problems. The construction preserves input length and retains clean combinatorial structure of tiling. I hope that this first step could be used as a master-problem for reductions to other nice owfs.
Tiles: unit squares with a letter at each corner; may be joined if the letters match. Expansion: maximal tile-by-tile unique (using given tiles) extension of a partial tiling of a square with marked border. 
Theorem 1 Tiling Expansion is a owf if and only if owfs exist.
The reduction. We start with a UTM, add a time counter that aborts after, say, n 2 steps. We preserve a copy of the program prefix and force it, as well as the input length, on the output. This produces a complete "computational" length-preserving owf. Now, we reduce the computation of the UTM, modified as above, to Tiling in a standard way. We add a special border symbol and restrict the tiles so that it can combine only with the input or output alphabets (of equal size), or with the end-tape symbol, or the state initiating the computation, depending on the sides of the tile. The expansion concept does the rest.
Tiling is a nice combinatorial entity, but it lacks determinism. This demands specifying all tiles in the square, which ruins the length preservation. Requiring the set of tiles to force deterministic computation would involve awkward definitions unlikely to inspire connections with noncomputational problems, reductions to which is the ultimate goal. Instead, expansion allows an arbitrary set of tiles but permits the extension of a partially tiled square only at places where such possible extension is unique. In this way, some partially tiled squares can be completed one tile at a time; others get stuck. This process is inefficient, but efficiency loss (small in parallel models) is not crucial here.
It remains an interesting problem to reduce this owf to other nice combinatorial or algebraic owfs thus proving their completeness.
The raw owfs, however, are hard to use. While many results, such as, e.g., pseudo-random generators, require no other assumptions, their constructions destroy efficiency almost entirely. To be useful, owfs need other properties, e.g., low Renyi entropy. This low entropy is also required for transforming weak owfs into strong ones (while preserving security, as in [28] ), and for other tasks. The following note suggests a way that may achieve this. (Its f (x) + ax can be replaced with other hashings.) 
